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I. JNTRODUCTION
Since it began promulgating rules to implement the local competition
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"),' the
Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") has been
under attack in the courts. The road has been a rough one, and the
Commission has lost on a good many issues. Most recently, for example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the
pricing rules that the Commission had directed states to use in setting
prices for incumbent local exchange carriers' ("ILECs" or "incumbents" or
"incumbent carriers") unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). 2 Earlier this
year, in separate opinions, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and
remanded key aspects of the Commission's collocation and reciprocal
compensation rules.3 In practical terms, the litigation has meant that
today-nearly four and one-half years after President Clinton signed the
1996 Act into law-much remains uncertain regarding the local
competition requirements.
The Commission has regularly accused its opponents in these legal
battles-chiefly the ILECs-of using litigation to impede the
implementation of the 1996 Act's local competition provisions. In October
1999, Chairman William Kennard upbraided a group of incumbent carriers
for refusing to "think about competition" and responding instead to the
Commission's rules with "confrontation." 4 In an earlier interview with the
Los Angeles Times, Chairman Kennard said that one reason why local
phone competition had not developed more quickly was that "too many of
the stakeholders in this debate would rather litigate than compete."5 Former
Chairman Reed Hundt was even more blunt. Incumbent carriers, he said,
rely on lawsuits to "bolster monopolies and stifle interstate commerce and
create years of litigation-induced delay.
' 6
These criticisms of incumbent carriers may not be wholly without
foundation. Some analysts have speculated that the largest incumbent
carriers, the regional Bell operating companies ("RBOCs"), may have
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000).
3. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bell Atlantic Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
4. Chris O'Brien, FCC Chairman Pushes Bells to Open Phone Networks, SAN JOSE
MERctRYNEws, Oct. 19, 1999.
5. Jube Shiver, Jr., Los Angles Times Interview; William Kennard: On Regulating the
Marketplace ofthe Telecommunications Boom, L.A. TIMDs, Jan. 18, 1998, at M3.
6. Bill Pietrucha, Hundt Calls Internet the Key to Competition, NEWSBYTEs NEWS
NErwoRK, Aug. 28, 1997, available at http:/web.lexis-nexis.comluniverse/printdoc.
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business reasons for protecting their existing positions in the local
exchange markets, at the expense of gaining entry into the long-distance
business under section 271. Even if these carriers have tried to use
litigation to postpone opening their networks to competitors, however, that
is only part of the picture. As discussed in this Article, if litigation has in
fact slowed the introduction of competition in the local exchange markets,
the Commission itself must share some of the blame. In several of the
Orders in which the Commission has implemented the 1996 Act's local
competition provisions, the Commission has acted aggressively, and it has
taken positions that have been in tension-if not directly at odds-with
some of the 1996 Act's key provisions. The FCC might more effectively
have encouraged the introduction of competition in the local markets had it
taken an approach less antagonistic toward parties affected by its local
competition rules and more defensible in light of the statute's provisions.
HI. THE STATUTE, THE COMMISSION'S ORDERS, AND THE
RESULTING LITIGATION
Although this Article is not meant as a comprehensive summary of
the 1996 Act or the Commission's local competition precedent, it is useful
to review quickly the background of the controversies discussed within."
A. The 1996Act
The 1996 Act's local competition provisions appear in sections 251
and 252.9 Acting on the hypothesis that competition would come more
swiftly to the local exchange markets if competitors were given access to
some of the incumbent carriers' existing facilities, Congress, in section
251, imposed certain duties on various types of local exchange carriers. °Incumbent carriers are subject to the most demanding requirements."
7. In order to offer interLATA, or long-distance, service, a Bell operating company
must demonstrate to the FCC that its markets are open to competition. See 47 U.S.C. § 271
(Supp. IV 1998); see also Bill Arkwright & Debbie Stipe, The Secret of OSS Success, 103
AM. NETWORK 50, Apr. 15, 1999 ("[Slome ILECs now appear less willing to accept the loss
of their local market revenues as a tradeoff to enter the long distance market."); Nightly
Business Report (Cmty. Television Found. of S. Ha, Inc. broadcast, Feb. 21, 2000) ("IT]he
Bell companies have more to lose from local competition than they have to gain from long
distance entry and that's part of the reason why it's taken so long.').
8. For a more complete discussion of the 1996 Act and its local competition
requirements, refer to Prmn W. HuBER ET AL., FDERAL ThLBCOMMUcNCATIONS LAW § 5.5
(2nd ed. 1999).
9. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252.
10. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 117-18, 120-24, 126 (1996).
11. The term "incumbent local exchange carrier" (often referred to as 'ILEC") is
defined in section 251(h) of the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(h). In essence, an incumbent
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Among many other things, incumbent carriers must provide requesting
telecommunications carriers with "unbundled access" to those network
elements that the Commission determines must be made available-that is,
incumbents must lease to competitors certain pieces or elements of their
networks. 12 The idea is that, by purchasing unbundled elements (such as the
"loop" or wire that connects the customer to the switch), new entrants will
be able to begin offering service without- having to build out the full
facilities needed to serve even a small number of customers.
Incumbent carriers must provide access "at any technically feasible
point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory."' 3 In deciding whether a network element must be
unbundled, the Commission is to consider, at a minimum, whether failure
to provide access to the element "would impair the ability of the
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer."'14 If a network element is "proprietary," the Commission
must consider whether access is "necessary."' 5
Section 252 of the 1996 Act sets forth a framework that incumbent
and competing carriers must use in arriving at agreements that will govern
the terms under which an incumbent will share its network with its
competitors, including the prices at which an incumbent will lease its
network elements to a competitor. If parties are unable to negotiate an
agreement voluntarily, the 1996 Act directs state commissions to arbitrate
open issues.' 6 In conducting this arbitration, state commissions must ensure
that the ultimate agreement meets the requirements of section 251,
"including the regulations prescribed by the Commission pursuant to
section 251.,' 17 Additionally, the state commission must establish rates for
interconnection, services, or network elements consistent with section
252(d), which provides, among other things, that rates for network
carrier is a local carrier that offered local exchange service before the 1996 Act was passed.
The RBOCs are the largest incumbent carriers, but there are also other large companies and
many much smaller carriers that come within the definition of ILEC. Although the 1996 Act
imposes market-opening requirements on most incumbent carriers, only the Bell operating
companies are precluded by section 271 from entering the long-distance markets unless they
make specific showings regarding the state of competition in their markets. See id. § 271.
12. Id. § 251(c)(3). A "network element" is "a facility or equipment used in the
provision of a telecommunications service," including the "features, functions, and
capabilities that are provided by means of such facility or equipment." Id § 153(29).
13. Id § 251(c)(3).
14. Id. § 251(d)(2)(B).
15. Id § 251(d)(1)(A).
16. Id § 252(b). If a state commission chooses not to act or otherwise fails to act on a
carrier's request for arbitration, the Commission must preempt the state commission's
jurisdiction of the proceeding and assume the state commission's role. Id § 252(e)(5).
17. Id. § 252(c)(1).
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elements shall be "based on the cost.., of providing the... network
element."' 8
As Justice Scalia observed in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, the 1996
Act is no model of clarity. 9 It is, rather, in "many important respects a
model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.' 0 The 1996 Act
leaves many key terms undefined. For example, whether an incumbent
must offer access to a given network element hinges on the meaning of
section 251(d)(2)'s terms "impair," "proprietary," and "necessary," but
these words are not defined in the statute. Nor does the statute make
apparent the roles that the FCC and state commissions are to play in setting
the rates and terms under which an incumbent must provide access to its
network. Section 251(d)(1) directs the Commission to "complete all actions
necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of [section
251],"2' and section 251(d)(2) tells the Commission to consider various
factors in deciding whether an element must be unbundled.2 At the same
time, however, section 252(d)(1) instructs state commissions to make
determinations regarding the "just and reasonable rate for network
elements."23 On top of everything else, Congress said nothing about how it
intended the 1996 Act to harmonize with section 2(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Ace'), which states that, subject to
certain specified exceptions, "nothing in this Act... shall be construed
to... give the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect to... charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service by wire."24
B. The Local Competition Order
In its 700-page Local Competition Order,2 issued six months after the
1996 Act was signed into law, the Commission adopted rules to implement
sections 251 and 252. Two aspects of this Order have proved especially
controversial. First, the FCC expansively interpreted its authority to issue
nationwide rules, including rate-setting requirements, to govern the local
exchange markets-thereby assigning itself a role that until then the state
18. Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).
19. 525 U.S. 366,397 (1999).
20. l4
21. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1).
22. Id. §251(d)(2).
23. Id. § 252(d)(1).
24. Id. § 152(b).
25. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Local Competition, Order].
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commissions had played almost exclusively. In addition, the FCC
promulgated a framework for the implementation of section 251 and
sweepingly interpreted that provision's network-opening requirements.
Declaring that it had authority to adopt "national pricing rules," the
FCC directed state commissions to use a particular methodology in
determining the prices that incumbents could charge for access to their
networks.26 The approach that the agency adopted is called the Total
Element Long Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") methodology2 7 Under
TELRIC, the prices for an incumbent's UNEs are calculated based on the
forward-looking costs of a hypothetical carrier that uses the most efficient
technology and network configuration possible. 8 In simplistic terms, an
incumbent carrier must lease its network elements to competitors at prices
based on an idealized version of what its network would look like if it were
built today, in the most efficient manner possible. How an incumbent's
network is actually configured is not relevant to the TELRIC inquiry.
Applying this methodology, the Commission set specific prices, or "proxy
prices," for states to use unless they were able to justify a departure based
• 29
on a cost study prepared to the FCC's specifications.
Second, the Commission broadly interpreted section 251(c)(3)'s
unbundling requirements. It ruled that section 251(c)(3)'s statement that
access be provided "at any technically feasible point" established an
expansive presumption that an incumbent must provide access to every
element that it is technically able to unbundle.30 The FCC went on to
interpret section 251(d)(2)'s "necessary" and "impair" standards in light of
this premise, such that section 251(d)(2) did not "significantly diminish the
obligation imposed by section 251(c)(3)."3 Accordingly, the Commission
held that whether access to an element was "necessary," or whether failure
to provide the element would "impair" a competitor's ability to provide
service, would be determined by looking only to the availability of
alternative facilities within an incumbent carrier's own network-not the
32
availability of comparable facilities from other sources.
C. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court Litigation
What has happened as a result of the Commission's Local
26. d para. 111.
27. See id. paras. 672-740.
28. See, e.g., id para. 685.
29. See id paras. 772-86.
30. Id. para. 278.
31. Id. para. 286.
32. Id. para. 287.
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Competition Order? To date, more than four years after the 1996 Act was
signed into law, the issues with which the Order dealt have not been fully
resolved. An appeal of the Commission's most recent unbundling
requirements has been held in abeyance, at the Commission's request, in
the D.C. Circuit since February 2000' 3 The Eighth Circuit has invalidated
the Commission's TELRIC methodology, and the Supreme Court will
likely address the validity of this approach sometime during the October
2000 term.
The story is one with which those in the telecommunications industry
are by now quite familiar. Immediately after the Commission promulgated
the Local Competition Order, an assortment of state public utility
commissions and incumbent carriers joined forces and brought suit in the
Eighth Circuit.34 These petitioners contended that section 252 of the 1996
Act gave state public utility commissions exclusive authority to set prices
for incumbents' networks, and that the Commission had therefore exceeded
its jurisdiction in imposing its pricing requirements on the states.3 In
addition, some of the petitioners, chiefly the incumbent carriers, asserted
that the FCC's unbundling rules violated the 1996 Act.36 Among other
things, these parties contended that the Commission had misread section
251(d)(2)'s limiting standards for determining when unbundling of a
network element is required.
37
In early 1997, a year after the Local Competition Order was
promulgated, the Eighth Circuit handed down its decision3 With respect to
the jurisdictional issues, the court ruled that the 1996 Act gave states the
sole authority to set rates associated with incumbents' networks, and it
vacated the FCC's pricing rules on that basis, without reviewing the
TELRIC methodology on its merits.39 The court rejected the argument,
however, that the Commission had unreasonably interpreted section
251(d)(2)'s "necessary" and "impair" standards (although it struck down
other unbundling requirements not discussed in this Article).40
The parties obtained review of the decision in the Supreme Court, and
in January 1999 (nearly three years after the 1996 Act was signed into law),
33. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, No. 00-1012, Order, (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3,
2000) (on file with the FDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWvlOURNAL).
34. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
35. Id. at 792.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 753.
39. Id. at 800.
40. Im. at 810-12.
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the Court issued an opinion that reversed most aspects of the Eighth
Circuit's decision. Significantly for the FCC, five members of the Court
ruled that the Commission possessed authority to design a nationwide
pricing methodology and could require states to set prices for incumbent
carriers' networks according to the FCC's rules.41 In a win for the
incumbent carriers, however, the Court held that the Commission had not
adequately considered section 251(d)(2)'s "necessary" and "impair"
standards in deciding which network elements incumbent carriers must
unbundle.'
42
Although the Supreme Court's decision may have settled the
jurisdictional issue, matters were by no means fully resolved. The opinion
required the Commission to reevaluate the "necessary" and "impair"
standards and to apply its new definitions of those terms in deciding which
network elements it would require incumbents to unbundle. The
Commission eventually released an Order that addressed this issue on
November 5, 1999, and used its revised understanding of section
251(d)(2)'s standards to establish a new list of network elements that
incumbents must provide to competitors4 3 The United States Telecom
Association, an industry group that represents incumbent carriers, has
petitioned for review of this Order in the D.C. Circuit, contending that once
again the Commission has not meaningfully limited incumbents'
unbundling obligations.44 The Commission asked the court to hold the case
in abeyance, pending the agency's action on petitions for reconsideration
filed by other parties.45 The court granted that motion and has taken no
46further action on the case.
The Supreme Court's opinion also left open the question whether the
Commission's TELRIC methodology was valid on its merits. The parties
returned to the Eighth Circuit in the fall of 1999 to contest that issue (as
41. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371-87 (1999). Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Clarence Thomas dissented from thisjurisdictional analysis. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
42. Id. at 387-91.
43. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 888 (1999).
44. See Motion of Petitioners for Expedition and for Coordinated Oral Argument,
United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (D.C. Cir. Docket Nos. 00-1015 & 00-1025) (filed
Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with the FEDERAL COmMUNICATIONs LAW JOLiRNAL).
45. See Motion to Hold in Abeyance, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (Docket
Nos. 00-1015 (and consolidated case)) (filed Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with the FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL).
46. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, No. 00-1012, Order (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3,
2000) (on file with the FEDERAL COMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL).
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well as other matters that had been remanded, which this Article does not
address). On July 18, 2000, the court issued a rather cryptic decision. It
rejected the incumbent carriers' contention that the term "cost," as used in
section 252(d)(1)(A), necessarily means "historical cost," and it accepted as
reasonable the FCC's conclusion that an incumbent's costs should be
determined based on a forward-looking model.47 The court vacated,
however, the specific TELRIC methodology that the Commission had
instructed state commissions to use. According to the court, the 1996 Act
did not permit costs to be based on a hypothetical network. "Congress was
dealing with reality," wrote the court, "not fantasizing about what might
be."48 The court clarified:
[I]t is the cost of providing the actual facilities and equipment that will
be used by the competitor (and not some state of the art presently
available technology ideally configured but neither deployed by the
[incumbent] nor to be used by the competitor) which must be
ascertained and determined49
The court sidestepped the question whether the Commission's TELRIC
methodology was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, ruling that the claim would not be ripe for review until actual
rates had been established under TELRIC.50
At least some aspects of the Eighth Circuit's decision are likely to be
tested in the Supreme Court this term. Earlier this year, the Court agreed to
review a Fifth Circuit decision that upheld the TELRIC methodology in
connection with the Commission's restructuring of the "universal service"
funding mechanism, where the TELRIC model is used to determine
incumbent carriers' costs of providing service in certain high-cost areas.5
In simplistic terms, GTE Service Corporation (which has since merged
with Bell Atlantic Corporation to form Verizon Communications) argues
that the FCC's use of the TELRIC methodology has resulted in an
47. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744,751-52 (8th Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 750.
49. Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 754.
5I. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No. 99-1427,
120 S. Ct. 2214 (June 5, 2000). Section 254 contains the 1996 Act's "universal service"
provisions. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. IV 1998). The term "universal service" describes the
policy that all Americans should have access to affordable basic telephone service,
regardless of whether they are low-income, and regardless of whether they live in areas that
are expensive to serve (such as rural areas). The Commission used the TELRIC
methodology to calculate the costs of serving different local customers, and incumbent
carriers will receive subsidies for providing service to high-cost customers based on these
calculations. The Commission's universal service policy is more completely described in
Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 7 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997).
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unconstitutional taking.52 Verizon has asked the Court to review a related
takings argument based on the Commission's use of TELRIC to set rates
for incumbents' network elements,53 and the Commission has also sought
review of the Eighth Circuit's resolution of pricing and other issues. 4
Because the Court has already expressed interest in the issue, it could likely
decide to review the Eighth Circuit's TELRIC ruling as well. Whether the
Commission may require states to follow the TELRIC approach, as
opposed to some other forward-looking model, will be settled only when
the Supreme Court rules on these issues.
D. Other Controversies
Although the bulk of the litigation over the Commission's local
competition requirements has centered on its pricing and unbundling rules,
the Commission's so-called "collocation" and "reciprocal compensation"
requirements-both of which bear significantly on local exchange
markets-have also been under attack in the federal appellate courts. Last
spring, important aspects of these rules were vacated and remanded to the
Commission for further consideration. To date, the FCC has sought
comment on the remanded issues, but has resolved neither matter.
5 6
The Commission's collocation requirements are found in section
251(c)(6), which imposes on incumbent carriers a duty to provide for
52. See GTE Serv. Corp., 183 F.3d 393, cert. granted, No. 99-1427, 120 S. Ct. 2214
(June 5, 2000).
53. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), petition for cert.filed sub
nom. Verizon Comms. Inc. v. FCC, 69 U.S.L.W. 3269 (Oct. 4,2000) (No. 00-511). See also
Verizon Told U.S. Supreme Court Late Wednesday it Wanted to Withdraw, CoMM. DAILY,
Oct. 20, 2000, at 3.
54. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), petition for cert.filed sub
norn. FCC v. Iowa Utils. Bdc, 69 U.S.L.W. 3282 (Oct. 13,2000) (No. 00-587).
55. As this Article went to press, Verizon had filed a motion with the Supreme Court
asking to withdraw its petition for review of the Fifth Circuit's decision. Industry analysts
and lobbyists have speculated that Verizon's request for withdrawal was part of its effort to
bolster its chances that the Supreme Court would review the Eighth Circuit's TELRIC
decision. Verizon Told U.S. Supreme Court Late Wednesday it Wanted to Withdraw, CoMM.
DAILY, Oct. 20,2000, at 3. As of October 30,2000, the Supreme Court had not ruled on
Verizon's request.
56. Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal Comp. Declaratory
Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Pleading Cycle Established,
Public Notice, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,311 (2000) [hereinafter Comments Sought on Reciprocal
Comp.]; In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms.
Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomm. Act
of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No.
96-98, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98, 98-147, paras. 81-83, 103-12, 119-28 (Aug. 10, 2000), 2000
WL 1128623 (F.C.C.) [hereinafter Deployment of Wireline Sens.].
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"physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access
to unbundled network elements."5 In everyday language, this means that
an incumbent must permit its competitors to physically place certain
"necessary" pieces of equipment on the incumbent's property so that
competitors can connect their own equipment with the incumbent's
network. Again, an incumbent's obligation turns on the meaning of the
term "necessary," which the statute leaves undefined.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board, the Commission issued an Order in March 1999 adding to
its existing collocation requirements.5' Among other things, the
Commission ruled that section 251(c)(6) permitted a competitor to
physically collocate as "necessary" any equipment that could be "used or
useful" for interconnection or access to an incumbent's unbundled network
elements, regardless of whether that equipment might provide other,
independent functionalities (such as switching or enhanced service
capabilities).5 9 The Order additionally permitted competitors to collocate
equipment they would use only to interconnect equipment with that of
other competing carriers, a process known as a "cross-connection."60
Finally, the Commission gave a competitor the right to collocate its
equipment "in any unused space" on an incumbent's premises and forbade
incumbents from requiring competitors to "collocate in a room or isolated
space separate from the incumbent's own equipment."6'
The D.C. Circuit struck down most of the Commission's new
collocation requirements, ruling that the agency had packed too much into
its interpretation of "necessary" under section 251(c)(6).62 Citing AT&T v.
Iowa Utilities Board, the court held that the FCC failed to construe the term
"consistent with the ordinary and fair meaning"63 of the word and
"'diverge[d] from any realistic meaning of the statute."' 4 The court singled
out the agency's cross-connect rules for particular criticism: "[T]he
Commission does not even attempt to show that cross-connects are in any
sense 'necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network
57. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
58. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 15
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 553 (1999) (hereinafter Collocation Order]. The Commission first
promulgated rules implementing section 251(c)(6) in its Local Competition, Order, supra
note 25, paras. 579-607.
59. Collocation Order, supra note 58, para. 28.
60. IL para. 33.
61. Il para. 42.
62. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
63. Id. at 423.
64. Id. quoting Massachusetts v. Dept. of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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elements.' Rather, the Commission is almost cavalier in suggesting that
cross-connects are efficient and therefore justified under § 251(c)(6). ' 5
The court also held that the rights the FCC gave competitors vis-4-vis
incumbent carriers were too extensive, observing that the Commission had
given "no good reason" why it gave competitors the ability to choose
where to establish collocation on an incumbent's property or why it
precluded incumbents from requiring competitors to collocate equipment in
isolated areas.6"
A few days later, the D.C. Circuit dealt the Commission another blow
by vacating the rules that the Commission had issued regarding "reciprocal
compensation" for calls made to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs").67
Section 251(b)(5) imposes on all local exchange carriers, both incumbent
and competing, a "duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements
for the transport and termination of telecommunications."68 Where more
than two local carriers collaborate to complete a call (as they often will in a
competitive environment), "reciprocal compensation" describes the
compensation that the carrier that terminates the call receives." The typical
arrangement (arrived at through the section 252 process) is that the
originating carrier pays the terminating carrier a per-minute transport and
termination fee. Thus, the longer a call lasts, the more the originating
carrier pays to the terminating carrier. In a typical situation, local traffic
should flow about equally in both directions, so neither carrier will end up
paying proportionally more in reciprocal compensation fees than the other.
How calls made to ISPs fit into this picture has proven to be
particularly problematic. The threshold question is whether calls to ISPs are
local, such that section 251(b)(5) applies, or whether they are long-
distance, such that they come under a different rubric, known as "access
charges. 70 The statute provides very little guidance on the issue, although
65. Id.
66. Id. at 426.
67. Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
69. Historically, the customer that has placed a local phone call has paid for all the costs
associated with that call, often via a flat monthly payment to his local exchange carrier that
allows him to make an unlimited number of local calls. When only one local exchange
carrier served an area, there was no need to worry about how to allocate costs of originating
and terminating a local call, because the same carrier performed both these functions. In a
competitive environment, however, local calls will frequently be handled by more than one
carrier-that is, a customer of one local carrier will make calls to a customer of a different
local carrier. Section 251(b)(5) therefore instructs carriers to establish a way of
compensating the so-called "terminating" carrier for the costs that it incurs in transporting
and terminating a local call.
70. The Commission has decided that section 251(b)(5) applies only where two local
carriers collaborate to complete a call. 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(a) (1999). For long-distance calls,
[Vol. 53
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1996 ACT
it appears to contemplate that the Commission will treat local and long-
distance calls differently.
7
'
If calls to ISPs are deemed local, then the following problem arises:
Assume that a competing carrier serves the ISP and an incumbent serves
most of the ISP's customers (most of whom pay the incumbent a flat
monthly fee for local service). Each time a customer places a call to the
ISP, the incumbent carrier winds up paying the competing carrier a per-
minute termination fee. Consider also the nature of ISP traffic. First, such
traffic is typically "one-way." That is, many customers call an ISP in order
to connect to the Internet, but an ISP seldom places calls to other
customers. Second, calls made to ISPs are typically much longer than the
average voice call, since people often surf the Internet for hours at a time.
The potential for regulatory arbitrage is obvious-a competing carrier that
signs up an ISP as a customer stands to collect far more in reciprocal
compensation fees than it will pay out in connection with serving that
customer.
The Commission undertook the rulemaking process to decide how
local carriers should be compensated when they collaborate to deliver a call
to an ISP, and issued an Order in February 1999.72 The FCC began by
deciding that calls to an ISP are jurisdictionally interstate, based on the
observation that a call to an ISP typically does not terminate at the ISP's
server, but frequently continues to an out-of-state web site. 3 Despite this
conclusion, however, the FCC ruled that state commissions were free, in
arbitrating section 252 disputes, to determine that reciprocal compensation
should be paid for this traffic.74
which typically originate in one local network and terminate in another, the costs of
origination and termination are governed by the Commission's "access charge" regime,
which has its origins in sections 201 and 202 of the Act. See Local Competition, Order,
supra note 25, paras. 1033-34. Under this framework, a calling party's long-distance carrier
pays both the originating and terminating local exchange carriers what are known as "access
charges" for the local costs involved in transmitting the long-distance call. Put very simply,
if a call is long-distance, the originating local carrier does not pay another local carrier for
the cost of terminating that call; that cost is paid by the long-distance carrier.
71. There is no indication that Congress intended to disturb the existing access charge
regime when it enacted section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation requirements.
Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that the Act "preserves the legal distinctions
between charges for transport and termination of local traffic and interstate and intrastate
charges for terminating long-distance traffic.' Local Competition, Order, supra note 25,
para. 1033.
72. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 15 Comm. Reg.
(P &F) 201 (1999) [hereinafter Reciprocal Comp. Order].
73. Id. para. 12.
74. it para. 25.
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The ruling pleased neither the competing carriers nor the incumbents,
and groups of both parties challenged the Commission's Order in the D.C.
Circuit. The competing carriers asserted that the Commission had
incorrectly decided the jurisdictional issue, contending that calls to ISPs
were actually local traffic.75 The incumbent carriers supported the agency's
jurisdictional determination, but maintained that the FCC had erred in
ruling that state commissions could nevertheless require them to pay
reciprocal compensation for calls to ISPs.76 Agreeing with the competing
carriers, the court held that the Commission had not satisfactorily explained
why it had concluded that calls to ISPs were interstate, and remanded the
issue to the FCC for further consideration. 1 The Commission has sought
comment on the remanded issues, but has not yet issued an Order.78
II. DISCUSSION
As a result of these various challenges to the Commission's local
competition rulings, much remains unresolved regarding exactly how the
1996 Act requires incumbent carriers to open their networks to
competition. Congress plainly hoped for certainty regarding these issues
within a much shorter time frame. It directed the Commission to complete
"all actions necessary to establish regulations" to implement section 251
within six months after the date of enactment of the 1996 Act.79 It would be
quite optimistic to think that such significant legislation could be fully
implemented in that time frame-affected parties were virtually certain to
dispute at least some of the FCC's determinations, regardless of how it had
decided the issues.
A review of the Commission's actions in its various local competition
Orders suggests that it need not have taken quite this long to reach the
current state of affairs. First, the Commission's decision to impose
mandatory pricing guidelines on the states-the legality of which the courts
took more than two years to resolve-may very well have been a needless
assertion of federal power. Had the Commission simply established pricing
guidelines and encouraged state commissions to set the prices for
incumbents' network elements based on forward-looking pricing
methodologies, there is every indication that the states would have
followed the Commission's lead. Second, the Commission has interpreted
key statutory terms in ways that have been in significant tension with the
75. Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 7-9.
78. Comments Sought on Reciprocal Comp., supra note 56.
79. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
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1996 Act. Had its approach been more circumspect, at least-some of the
litigation and subsequent agency proceedings that have held up the
implementation of the 1996 Act likely would have been avoided.
A. Were the National Pricing Rules Really Necessary?
In its Local Competition Order, the Commission took the position
that it was critical to "establish among the states a common, pro-
competition understanding of the pricing standards for interconnection and
unbundled elements." 80 Waiting for a common interpretation to emerge
through the section 252 process, the Commission reasoned, would result in
unacceptably lengthy delays in the development of competition in the local
markets."'
In retrospect, however, it appears that the Commission's edict that the
states follow its national pricing rules caused a delay of more than two
years-the time it took for the Supreme Court to issue its decision in AT&T
v. Iowa Utilities Board. Although the Court ultimately vindicated the
FCC's position regarding its authority to set national requirements, it is
unclear whether the agency actually gained anything by drawing a
jurisdictional line in the sand. If the FCC's objective was for states to apply
TELRIC-like methodologies to price incumbents' network elements, the
agency could have achieved that goal simply by offering guidance on how
states should shape their own forward-looking methodologies. As the
Eighth Circuit indicated, such an approach undoubtedly would have been
upheld on review."2
There is no reason to think that states would have refused to follow
the Commission's guidance. Rather, the evidence supports the opposite
conclusion. As the FCC itself recognized at the time the Local Competition
Order was issued, many states had adopted forward-looking, long-term
incremental cost methodologies for setting prices for UNEs.!3 These states
almost certainly would have continued to adhere to their already
established approaches, perhaps modified to conform more closely to the
Commission's recommendations, and those states that had not yet adopted
a framework for pricing network elements very likely would have acted on
80. Local Competition, Order, supra note 25, para. 618.
81. Id.
82. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 597, 607 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling
that the agency could express to the states a preference for a particular pricing methodology,
such as usage-based pricing).
83. See Local Competition, Order, supra note 25, para. 631 nn.1508-14 (noting that
California, Michigan, Texas, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Washington, Wisconsin,
Connecticut, Arizona, Ohio, Missouri, Wyoming, and Oklahoma had either adopted or were
considering whether to adopt TELRIC-like approaches to pricing network elements).
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the Commission's advice. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Eighth Circuit's
decision, when the FCC's pricing rules were stayed pending review by the
Supreme Court and states were free to use whatever methodology they
wished to price incumbents' network elements, most states nevertheless
established rates pursuant to the Commission's TELRIC methodology.Y
Had the Commission taken a less antagonistic approach toward the
states in its Local Competition Order, at the very least an appeals court
would have weighed in on the merits of TELRIC much sooner than July
2000, when the Eighth Circuit finally released a ruling on this issue. A
decision most likely would have been reached by early to mid-1997.
Moreover, in the absence of the jurisdictional dispute, it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would have agreed to review an appellate decision on the
FCC's Local Competition Order. The Court would have been presented
only with questions regarding the legitimacy of TELRIC and the
Commission's unbundling rules. Even though the Court recently has shown
interest in the constitutional validity of the Commission's TELRIC
methodology, it is improbable that it would have wanted to review rules
that were not actually binding on the states85 Nor would the Court likely
84. See e.g., GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 739, 746-48 (4th Cir. 1999)
(noting that Virginia state commission voluntarily adopted TELRIC pricing following
Eighth Circuit's stay of those pricing rules); Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. McMahon, 80
F. Supp.2d 218, 235 (D. Del. 2000) (observing that the Delaware commission "voluntarily
adopted the Local Competition Orders' TELRIC methodology even though that portion of
the Local Competition Order had never gone into effect"); Consol. Issues Raised in Petitions
for Arbitration Pending Before the Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Telecomms. Arbitration Case,
Order No. 5, at 5-6 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 8, 1996), 1996 WL 694995 (adopting
the Commission's TELRIC "proxy rates" as interim rates); Approval of Agreements and
Arbitration of Unresolved Issues Arising Under § 252 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Case
No. 8731, Phase 11, Order No. 73707, 180 P.U.R. 4th 521 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept 27,
1997) (adopting forward-looking cost pricing methodology); Investigation Regarding Local
Exch. Competition for Telecomms. Servs., Telecomms. Decision and Order, Docket No.
TX95120631, at 8-9 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. Dec. 2, 1997), 1997 WL 795071("ICThe Board
HEREBY ADOPTS the principles upon which the [Commission's] TELRIC model is based.
Adopting a methodology based on forward-looking, economic costs.. . will best replicate to
the extent possible the conditions of a competitive market."); MFS Intelenet of Pa, Inc.,
MFS Phase III, Interim Order, Docket Nos. A-310302F0002, et al., at 13 (Pa. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n Apr. 10, 1997) ("[Wle will continue to use TELRIC as a tool to evaluate the
proposals before us and view the [Local Competition Order] as instructive"); Pet. to
Establish a Proceeding to Review the State of Generally Available Terms and Conditions
Offered by Bell Atlantic in Accordance with Sections 251, 252, and 271 of the Telecomn.
Act of 1996, Order on Arbitration, Case Nos. 96-1516-T-PC, et al., at 34 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Apr. 21, 1997) ("MIrhe Commission will adopt rates and prices for
interconnection, [network elements] and collocation based on a TELRIC methodology.").
85. Robert L. Stem, et. al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.18, at 224 (6th ed. 1986)
quoting Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) ('T]he
lack of finality in the judgment below may 'of itself alone' furnish 'sufficient ground for the
denial of the application."').
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have found questions regarding the reasonableness of the Commission's
unbundling rules worthy of review, as they presented only questions of the
reasonableness of the FCC's statutory interpretation."
In retrospect, it appears that there was little need for the Commission
to autocratically direct the states to follow its pricing rules, as it did in the
Local Competition Order. Instead, had the Commission simply
recommended that the states use TELRIC to price network elements, the
states would very probably have followed the FCC's lead, and any
challenges to the merits of the TELRIC methodology would have been
resolved sooner. At the very least, there would have been little downside to
the Commission simply testing this approach. If states had refused to go
along with the Commission's pricing guidelines, the FCC could then have
stepped in with mandatory rules.
B. Have the Commission's Expansive Statutory Interpretations
Delayed Implementation of the Local Competition Requirements?
The Commission's understanding of certain key terms in the 1996 Act
has also met with significant opposition in the courts. As described above,
the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, as well as the Supreme Court, have remanded
various issues to the FCC for further consideration. The litigation and
subsequent agency proceedings on the remanded matters have eaten up
considerable time. To be sure, the task of implementing the 1996 Act,
which left so many important questions open to debate, was a formidable
one. Nevertheless, the Commission has taken positions in its Local
Competition Orders that were highly susceptible to attack in the courts.
Had the agency more carefully thought through the consequences of the
positions it decided to take, providers of local telecommunications would
very likely be operating under a more stable set of rules today.
Consider, for example, the Commission's interpretation of section
251(d)(2)'s access standards. The provision directs the Commission to
determine which network elements incumbents must unbundle, based on
the "necessary" and "impair" considerations described above. The
Commission began by reading into this subsection an additional
requirement, which it lifted from section 251(c)(3), that incumbents must
provide access to all network elements for which it is technically feasible
to provide access."7 Operating on this presumption, the Commission
decided that section 251(d)(2) simply authorized it to "decline to require
86. Id. § 4.17, at 221-24 (noting that the Court generally will not grant certiorari just
because the decision below may be erroneous).
87. Local Competition, Order, supra note 25, para. 278; 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (Supp.
IV 1998).
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incumbent [carriers] to provide access to unbundled network elements at
technically feasible points." ss From there, the Commission went on to
announce that section 252(d)(2)'s "necessary" and "impair" standards
would be met if denial of access to an element meant a competitor would
experience any increase in cost or any decrease in quality, regardless of
whether it could obtain the element from a source outside the incumbent's
network.89
This reading of the 1996 Act is nothing short of tortured. First, the
FCC's understanding of the relationship between section 251(c)(3) and
section 251(d)(2) finds no support in the statutory language. As the Eighth
Circuit observed, "[b]y its very terms," section 251(c)(3) establishes only
"where unbundled access may occur, not which elements must be
unbundled." 90 Section 251(d)(2) sets out the criteria for determining which
network elements must be made available, and that provision does not
contain any general presumption that incumbents must unbundle all
network elements. Second, the Commission's interpretation of section
252(d)(2) essentially read the "necessary" and "impair" standards out of the
statute. In effect, the agency said that "whatever requested element can be
provided must be provided."9' As the Supreme Court declared, if Congress
had intended to give competitors such sweeping access to incumbents'
networks, it would not have included section 251(d)(2) in the statute at
a11.92
The FCC's lawyers must surely have recognized the stretch. If the
agency's aim was to promulgate rules that would quickly bring competition
to the local exchange markets, it would have served that goal far better by
interpreting the statute in a way that was at least defensible on review,
particularly on issues so central to incumbents' section 251 obligations.
Had the FCC been able to justify its interpretation of section 252(d)(2), its
rules implementing this provision would have been final, at the latest, by
February 1999, when the Supreme Court issued its decision. Instead,
petitions for reconsideration of the FCC's second stab at the issue are
88. Id. para. 279.
89. Id. para. 283.
90. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 810 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see
also AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 391 (1999) ("The Commission's premise was
wrong. Section 251(d)(2) does not authorize the Commission to create isolated exemptions
from some underlying duty to make all network elements available. It requires the
Commission to determine on a rational basis which network elements must be made
available, taking into account the objectives of the Act and giving some substance to the
'necessary' and 'impair' requirements." (emphasis added)).
91. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 390.
92. Id.
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currently pending before the agency, and after the FCC acts on these
petitions, the D.C. Circuit is likely to review the matter.
Perhaps these criticisms simply second guess the Commission. After
all, the Commission was struggling to put together an enormous Order in a
very short time frame, and no court had yet weighed in on any aspect of the
1996 Act. In such circumstances, the Commission conceivably could have
overlooked the leap of logic it made in its original interpretation of sections
251(c)(3) and 251(d)(2), but the same cannot be said of the Commission's
more recently issued Collocation Order.93
In that ruling, issued only weeks after the Supreme Court had handed
down an opinion pinpointing the deficiencies in the Commission's
interpretation of section 252(d)(2), the FCC again addressed the term
"necessary." This time the word appeared in section 251(c)(6), which
allows competitors to collocate equipment that is "necessary" to access
network elements or to interconnect. Once again, as discussed above, the
Commission relied on a definition that went far beyond any fair meaning of
the term. Without even mentioning the Supreme Court's discussion of the
term, the agency ruled that equipment was "necessary" if it was "used or
useful" for interconnection or access to network elements, regardless of
whether the equipment might also be used for other purposes.94 Relying on
AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's
rules. The Commission, it held, had failed to "operate within the limits of
'the ordinary and fair meaning of [the statute's] terms."' 95
As compared to the Local Competition Order, it is much more
difficult to see the Collocation Order as an excusable lapse in agency
judgment. The Commission had the benefit of the Supreme Court's AT&T
v. Iowa Utilities Board decision, and it was not rushing to meet a statutory
deadline. The Commission's disregard of the statute is, as the D.C. Circuit
described it, "almost cavalier. ' 96 For example, in one staggering paragraph,
the FCC wrote that it would not require incumbent carriers to permit
collocation of equipment that is "not necessary for either access to UNEs
or for interconnection." 97 The agency reasoned that the record before it did
not sufficiently support such a requirement, although it held out the
possibility that it might impose one in the future.9
93. See Collocation Order, supra note 58.
94. Id. para. 28.
95. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416,424 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting AT&T, 525
U.S. at 390).
96. Id. at 423.
97. Collocation Order, supra note 58, para. 30 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
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It is certainly unsettling that the Commission could even suggest that
-- despite section 251(c)(6)'s manifest directive that incumbents had a duty
to allow the collocation only of "necessary" equipment-it could still
somehow require the collocation of unnecessary equipment. More to the
point, however, it is remarkable that with this Order the FCC, yet again,
seems to have shot itself in the foot. Had the agency promulgated more
defensible rules, its collocation requirements would have become final in
March 2000, with the D.C. Circuit's decision. By promulgating rules that
did not withstand review on the first go-round, however, the FCC wound
up with yet another delay. The agency sought comment on the remanded
issues just last summer.99 At the earliest, a new set of collocation rules
could come sometime before the close of 2000, and those requirements will
themselves not be final until a court has reviewed them.
The FCC's March 1999 Reciprocal Compensation Order provides a
final illustration of how the Commission's adoption of hard-to-defend
requirements has ended up impeding its implementation of the 1996 Act's
local competition provisions. In that Order, the Commission relied on
certain of its previous decisions that involved long-distance (or
"interexchange") carriers, rather than ISPs. The Commission offered only
the most cursory of explanations to support its determination that this
precedent controlled: "Although the cited cases involve interexchange
carriers rather than ISPs, and the Commission has observed that 'it is not
clear that ISPs use the public switched network in a manner analogous to
[interexchange carriers],' ... the Commission's observation does not affect
the jurisdictional analysis."' ° Not surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit found this
justification unsatisfactory.'
The court did not address the Commission's even more baffling
decision that, although it had determined calls to ISPs were jurisdictionally
interstate, it would nevertheless leave regulation of those calls to the states.
The court simply observed in dicta that the Commission's jurisdictional
analysis yielded "intuitively backwards results," in that intrastate calls
would be subject to federal reciprocal compensation standards, but state
regulators would set compensation for interstate cals to ISPs.'02
Because the Commission again adopted rules that it was unable to
justify to a court, local carriers continue to operate under uncertain rules
99. Deployment of Wireline Servs., supra note 56.
100. Reciprocal Comp. Order, supra note 72, para. 12 n.36, quoting In the Matter of
Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exch. Carriers; Transp.
Rate Structure and Pricing End User Common Line Charges, First Report and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 15,982, para. 345,7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997).
101. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 6.
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regarding reciprocal compensation for calls to ISPs. The Commission has
sought comment on the issue and should release an Order addressing the
matter sometime in late 2000.103 Assuming that interested parties petition a
court for review of that decision, and the court upholds the FCC's new
rules, the requirements would become final at the earliest when the
reviewing court issues a decision sometime next spring-nearly two years
after the Commission issued its previous Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
As revealed by this review of the Commission's local competition
precedent, the agency's approach to implementing the 1996 Act's local
competition requirements has, in important respects, backfired. Affected
parties have taken the FCC to court over dubious rules fashioned in the
Local Competition Order and its subsequent decisions. The litigation and
subsequent proceedings on remand have taken a long time. Today-more
than four years since the agency released its initial Order-significant
aspects of its pricing, unbundling, collocation, and reciprocal compensation
rules remain unsettled. Even where the agency has ultimately prevailed, as
it did on the jurisdictional issue in the Supreme Court, the question whether
winning was worth the time and effort it took remains open.
Paradoxically, the FCC has taken aggressive positions in an effort to
bring competition to the local exchange markets more quickly. It seems to
have missed the point that quickly setting up a stable set of ground rules
might better have served this objective. Had the FCC initially taken a less
controversial view of its role and of the 1996 Act's network-opening
requirements, carriers today would be operating under a more certain set of
local competition rules.
103. Comments Sought on Reciprocal Comp., supra note 56.
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